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The Putin Phenomenon 
 
STEPHEN WHITE AND IAN MCALLISTER 
 
The Putin presidency in Russia became increasingly popular as it progressed and a leadership cult 
developed around the president himself. Not only was there general satisfaction with the leadership as a 
whole, there was also evidence that it was regarded as increasingly successful in all fields of policy, 
particularly in international affairs; and focus group discussions as well as surveys suggested the newly 
elected president, Dmitri Medvedev, would be expected to continue those policies. A closer 
examination of the survey evidence suggests that the Putin leadership in fact had relatively weak roots 
in the wider society, and drew widely but superficially on public support. More than anything else it 
was the strong economic performance of these years that generated support for the Putin presidency, 
and this suggested that any future leader would depend for his position on maintaining that economic 
performance in what were now more difficult circumstances. 
 
On paper, the powers of the Russian president are formidable – so formidable that 
some have described it as a ‘super-presidency’, with an ability to make appointments, 
take decisions and define the main directions of public policy that leaves the other 
branches of government in a wholly subordinate position.1 But for others it has 
remained a ‘semi-presidential’ system, with a dual executive: as well as the president, 
a prime minister who is accountable to an elected parliament.2 Much depended on 
what was understood by the ‘accountability’ of the prime minister in this connection. 
It was certainly some distance from the French system: the Russian prime minister did 
not depend on a parliamentary majority, he did not necessarily represent the largest 
party (or any party at all), and although the parliament could pass a vote of no 
confidence, this did not necessarily result in the replacement of the government – the 
president could choose instead to dissolve the parliament and call fresh elections. ‘If 
this is a semi-presidential system’, Sartori concludes in apparent despair, ‘it is an ill-
conceived one’.3
Several attempts have been made to develop a scale against which the strength of 
presidential powers can be evaluated within a broadly comparative context. The most 
influential of these formulations has identified a critical set of variables that extend 
across a president’s legislative and extra-legislative powers.4 Measured in this way, 
the powers of the Russian president are certainly extensive, but they are not all-
encompassing. The president can veto legislation, but his veto can be overridden by 
the legislature, and he cannot veto part of a piece of legislation. The president can 
issue decrees on his own authority, but only if they do not contradict the Constitution 
and existing legislation, and he has no monopoly of the right to initiate legislation. 
The Russian president does not introduce the annual budget – this is the responsibility 
of government; and he cannot call a referendum on his own authority, although he 
issues a decree to this effect when the legal requirements have been satisfied – 
normally, when at least two million citizens have signed a petition to this effect. 
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Apart from this, the Russian president appoints members of the government, 
although his nomination to the premiership requires the approval of the lower house, 
and he can dismiss individual ministers or the government as a whole without 
reference to parliament, which is a power as extensive as any that exists in any other 
presidential system. Parliament can express its lack of confidence in the government, 
in which case the president must either accept its resignation or call new elections. 
The president, finally, has the power to dissolve the legislature, but can do so only if 
the Duma (lower house) refuses to accept three consecutive nominations to the 
premiership, if it passes a vote of no confidence in the government twice in three 
months, or if it refuses to support the government when the prime minister himself 
puts a vote of confidence (these are ‘restricted’ powers of dissolution in terms of the 
Shugart–Carey classification). Taken together, this range of legislative and non-
legislative powers suggests a presidency that is more dominant than the French, and 
about as powerful as the American, but well short of the Mexican or several other 
Latin American presidencies. 
 The Shugart–Carey scale, however, misses a number of important variables. The 
Russian president, for instance, enjoys very far-reaching powers of appointment 
within the judiciary, including the Supreme Court, the Higher Arbitration Court and 
the Constitutional Court, which is supposed to monitor his actions: the president 
enjoys the exclusive right of nomination in this case, although the Federation Council 
(upper house) must formally approve his proposals; in all other cases the president is 
entitled to make the appointment on his own authority. The scale makes no reference 
to emergency powers, which some regard as ‘crucial’;5 nor does it take account of the 
increasingly common practice of judicial review, by which a president can ask the 
courts to rule on the constitutionality of legislation before he signs it, or mention the 
ultimate sanction of impeachment. Perhaps most fundamentally of all, any exercise of 
this kind equates formal powers with political authority in a system in which a great 
deal still depends on the individual office-holder. As Elster has pointed out, a 
president who looks powerful on paper may be ‘quite weak in reality (and vice 
versa)’, and in any case the powers of the presidency are difficult to distinguish from 
the particular qualities of the ‘exceptional personalities that have held this office over 
the relatively short period of postcommunist rule’.6
The importance of ‘exceptional personalities’ has certainly been borne out in the 
early years of Russia’s post-communist presidency. It was Boris Yeltsin who 
personally decided to face down his opponents in the Russian parliament, and then 
imposed his own rules of the game in a new Constitution that underpinned his 
dominant position. The war on breakaway Chechnya began in 1994 on the basis of a 
secret presidential decree; much of the privatization programme rested on a similar 
foundation. The arbitrary replacement of five prime ministers in 1998–99, and then 
the choice of Putin as successor, were entirely personal decisions; not even his own 
family, apparently, knew he would be retiring at the end of 1999 until ‘practically the 
last minute’.7 It was Vladimir Putin, in turn, who restored the political authority of the 
presidency, using his decree powers to establish a new system of federal districts at 
the start of his administration, and his powers of appointment to bring forward a new 
leadership that drew heavily if not exclusively on his former colleagues in the security 
services.8 It was Putin, once again, in his speech of September 2004 following the 
Beslan hostage-taking crisis, who initiated a new series of centralizing changes in the 
structures of government, and who introduced a system of ‘national projects’ the 
following year by presidential decree. 
In what follows we focus on this ‘personal’ element in the Russian presidency, at a 
time when the formal powers of the office are no longer sufficient to define the 
incumbent as the dominant member of the leadership, and in which it is Putin, as 
prime minister since May 2008, who holds that position and who clearly does so 
because of his personal authority rather than his constitutional prerogatives. We 
examine, first of all, the remarkable ‘cult of personality’ that developed around Putin 
as Russian president over the course of his two presidential terms. We move on to 
consider the popular evaluation of his performance as president over the same period, 
in general and more policyspecific terms, using focus group discussions as well as 
more conventional quantitative evidence. We conclude with an analysis of the sources 
and nature of his support, drawing on a national representative survey that was 
conducted between the two elections in the early months of 2008.9 To anticipate, we 
find that Putin’s support is widely and evenly distributed; this provides a basis for 
record approval ratings, but little evidence of a commitment to the person or the office 
that will be sufficient to insulate them from a judgement about the success of their 
policies, and particularly their economic performance, over the years to come. 
 
Towards a Leadership Cult 
 
Putin took over the presidency on an acting basis at the end of 1999, and finally left 
office in May 2008 (see Table 1). Within a year of his accession, foundry workers in 
the Urals were casting him in bronze; not far away, weavers were making rugs with 
the president’s face inside a golden oval. In Magnitogorsk, the overalls Putin had 
worn during a visit were on display in the city museum.10 A factory in Chelyabinsk 
had begun to produce a watch with a presidential image on its dial, and a local 
confectioner was selling a cake with the same design; a ‘Putin bar’ had opened 
elsewhere in the town, selling ‘Vertical power’ kebabs and ‘When Vova was little’ 
milk-shakes.11 An all-female band had meanwhile ‘taken the airwaves by storm’ with 
its single ‘Someone like Putin’ (someone who, among other things, ‘doesn’t drink’ 
and ‘won’t run away’).12 Putin’s fiftieth birthday in September 2002 brought further 
tributes: Argumenty i fakty readers wanted to present their president with a samurai 
sword, a portable toilet ‘so that he can wipe out whoever he wants whenever he 
wants’,13 or even ‘my love and perhaps a child as well’.14 The most original 
 
TABLE 1 
RUSSIAN PRESIDENTS AND PRIME MINISTERS, 1991 – 2008 
 
Presidents Elected Inaugurated Re-elected Left office 
Boris Yeltsin 12 Jun 1991 10 Jul 1991 3 Jul 1996 31 Dec 1999a
Vladimir Putin 26 Mar 2000 7 May 2000 14 Mar 2004 7 May 2008 
Dmitri Medvedev 2 Mar 2008 7 May 2008 
 
Prime ministers Nominated Approved Re-appointed Left office 
Yegor Gaidar 8 Dec 1992 - - 9 Dec 1992b
Viktor Chermomyrdin 14 Dec 1992 14 Dec 1992 10 Aug 1996 23 Mar 1998 
 
Sergei Kirienko 23 Mar 1998 24 Apr 1998 - 23 Aug 1998 
 
Yevgenii Primakov 10 Sep 1998 11 Sep 1998 - 12 May 1999 
Sergei Stepashin 12 May 1999 19 May 1999 - 9 Aug 1999 
Vladimir Putin 9 Aug 1999 16 Aug 1999 - 7 May 2000 
Mikhail Kas’yanov 7 May 2000 17 May 2000 - 24 Feb 2004 
Mikhail Fradkov 1 Mar 2004 5 Mar 2004 12 May 2004 12 Sep 2007 
Viktor Zubkov 12 Sep 2007 14 Sep 2007 - 7 May 2008 
Vladimir Putin 7 May 2008 8 May 2008   
Notes:  
a Yeltsin resigned before the end of his second term and Putin became acting president until his election 
and inauguration the following May. 
b Gaidar was acting prime minister from 15 June 1992 but his formal nomination was rejected by the 
Russian Congress of People’s Deputies on 9 December 1992.  
 
was from a former deputy prime minister of Bashkortostan: a three-page ode that 
consisted exclusively of words beginning with the letter ‘p’ and concluded with the 
assurance that ‘Po planete postavyat pamyatniki Pervomy Prezidentu Planety Putin’ 
(‘All around the planet they will put up monuments to the first president of the planet, 
Putin’).15 
Matters went even further in Izborsk, an unprepossessing town in the Pskov region 
where the presidential motorcade had made an unscheduled stop in August 2000. 
Visitors were offered a tour ‘In Putin’s footsteps’ that included the places ‘where 
Putin bought a cucumber’, ‘where Putin took off his jacket and tried water from a 
spring’, and ‘where Putin touched a tree and made a wish’.16 The interior minister, the 
human-rights ombudsman and the Latvian ambassador were among the many state 
officials who had taken the tour, all of whom had ‘come up to the wishing tree and 
made their secret wish just as Putin did’; a local paper meanwhile reproduced the 
recipe for the cucumber, warning that they should be picked early in the morning and 
‘washed three times, preferably in holy water’.17 In Irkutsk the chair on which Putin 
had sat during his April 2002 visit was sold at public auction to the local veterinary 
inspector, who hoped the ‘Putin spirit [would] infect us with its energy, decency and 
honesty’.18 In St. Petersburg a tree the future president had planted was decorated 
with a commemorative plaque; elsewhere, ski slopes and churches were being 
renamed in his honour.19 And there were tours of the president’s home town – not of 
its familiar tourist sights but of the back streets and alleys in which the young Putin 
had grown up, and of the ‘clean and orderly’ communal flat in which the whole 
family had lived during those years.20 
The president appeared to enjoy particularly high levels of support among women. 
Pravda reported a distressing case from Yaroslavl’, where there was a ‘new category 
of patients – women who are madly in love with President Vladimir Putin’. Lyudmila, 
in her late thirties, had started to collect newspaper articles about the president; she 
soon accumulated a thick file, which she kept in a locked bedside cabinet. She asked 
her husband to turn down the television when Putin was speaking on the radio, and 
made no move to feed him two weeks later when he came home starving from work, 
sitting ‘bedazzled’ in front of the television as Putin gave an interview (they had such 
a fight they stopped speaking to each other for three days). Finally she moved into the 
children’s room, where she hung a portrait of the president above the bed, but her 
husband came in and threw everything on the floor. Lyudmila dissolved in tears, and 
the only way forward appeared to be a private psychiatrist. Lyudmila’s case, he 
explained, was ‘not unique’; women saw Putin as a ‘superhusband, the ideal partner’, 
someone who would ‘never betray them, and never get dead drunk’ (there was hope 
meanwhile that Lyudmila would ‘soon recover’).21 
The president figured as the fictitious hero in two plays that were premiered in 
2004, at the end of his first term of office. In one of them, Oleg Bogaev’s ‘Secret 
Society of Bicyclists’, a mother unexpectedly finds herself pregnant to the president, 
who appears to her every night in a dream. In the other, Konstantin Kostenko’s ‘Radio 
Serial’, one of the female characters explains that she is  
 
going to vote for Putin. . . . Wouldn’t it be nice if, say, you went to the polling station 
and everyone who voted for Putin was given a little Putin, a little president – one for 
every customer? In a nice little package? They cloned Dolly the sheep, but they can’t 
clone Putin and make one for every Russian woman! Give every woman a good 
husband! A little president for every Russian woman to have at home. I’d put mine on 
the TV, or a doily, and use a little rag to wipe the dust off him. And on weekends I’d 
take him to bed with me. To sleep with me. . . 
One thing I’m sure of. Even though he’s a Russian, I’m absolutely sure Putin doesn’t 
drink! Not a lot, anyway. And he doesn’t reek of alcohol in bed! And he has everything 
in working order down there, in that department. Now he’s a man I’d go to bed with. . 
..22 
The papers carried real-life experiences as well, including the story of Vera, now a 
married pensioner, who told Sobesednik about their New Year’s Eve game of spin the 
bottle. ‘When Volodya spun the bottle, it stopped on me’, she recalled. ‘Our kiss was 
short, true. I suddenly became very hot’.23 
There was a particularly strong reaction when a series of photographs of a bare-
chested Russian president riding horses, rafting and fishing in a Siberian river were 
published on the Kremlin website in the summer of 2007. Komsomol’skaya pravda 
splashed one of them over its entire front page with the advice that its readers could 
‘be like Putin’ if they undertook a set of recommended exercises.24 There was a very 
positive response from the paper’s female readers, who posted comments on its 
website praising the president’s ‘vigorous torso’; gay chat-rooms, apparently, were 
also intrigued by the photographs, some of them claiming that ‘Putin, by stripping to 
his waist, was somehow pleading for more tolerance for homosexuality’.25 The 
following year the president featured in another action-man sequence when he seized 
a rifle and fired a tranquillizer dart into an Ussuri tiger when it escaped and began to 
threaten scientists and a film crew during a visit to a national park in the Far East.26 A 
gossip magazine, Secrets of the Stars, rapidly sold out when it issued a special edition 
‘wholly devoted to [Putin’s] virility and reputation’ and promising revelations about 
his youthful romances. ‘There’s not a single woman’, the magazine explained, ‘who 
would not dream of embracing and kissing Vladimir Vladimirovich and hearing his 
declaration of love’.27 
The name Putin, it became clear, could be used for all kinds of purposes. An 
Astrakhan’ company, for instance, began to produce a range of pickled aubergines 
under the ‘PuTin’ label (they ingeniously avoided the restrictions that applied in such 
matters by substituting a sword for the letter ‘T’). Sales increased by a quarter, 
encouraging the company to move into a similar line of fish products.28 In Omsk, 
‘Putin pel’meni’ [meat dumplings] were on sale; elsewhere, an enterprising 
confectionery firm had prepared a full-size chocolate bust, and chocolate portraits 
were on offer.29 Ordinary portraits could be picked up in any large bookshop; 
enthusiasts could buy a more elaborate version made of Swarowski crystals, or order a 
picture from a professional artist for a thousand dollars upwards.30 A Urals vegetable 
farmer was disappointed when he tried to patent a tomato he had named after the 
president because it was ‘so fit and hardy’.31 But there was a popular vodka called 
Putinka (though it ‘tasted like all the others’),32 and a ‘Putin collective farm’,33 and a 
computer game called ‘The Four Oligarchs’ in which the president recovered banks 
and oil companies from his opponents and installed his loyalists in parliament.34 An 
exhibition in St Petersburg was meanwhile offering visitors ‘Three Minutes with V.V. 
Putin’, an opportunity to spend a little time with a model of the president in his study 
reading a book of essays on the history of the Baltic fleet with his faithful Labrador 
dog by his side.35 
Putin’s name was invoked in another way by a fashion designer who was also a 
leading member of the pro-Kremlin youth movement, Nashi. Responding to the 
president’s appeals for larger families, she launched a new line of ribboned red-and 
white knickers with the words ‘Vova, I’m with you’ emblazoned on the crotch. There 
were also patriotic T-shirts, the most popular of which had the words ‘Government 
Health Warning: Reproduction is Good for your Health’ across the front (president-
elect Medvedev had bought one of the T-shirts, but not the frilly undergarment).36 
There were Putin sayings, or at least there were supposed to be: for instance, ‘When 
Putin smiles, a child is born. If the smile is wider than usual, expect twins’; or ‘A fork 
that Putin ate from can kill a vampire with a single stab’.37 And there were Putin 
jokes, some of them taking their cue from the president’s celebrated assurance that he 
would ‘wipe out the terrorists, even if they were on the john’. A Russian general, for 
instance, is asked: ‘Why haven’t you killed a single terrorist?’ He replies: ‘They don’t 
use the john. . .’ Or an announcement on the door of the toilet: ‘Don’t come in! 
Wiping out terrorists. Putin’. Or ‘It’s Gusinsky’s turn for the john’.38 
Some accounts were already suggesting that the president might have more than 
ordinary powers. In Alexander Olbik’s novel Prezident, published in 2002, a badly 
wounded Putin knocks the Chechen leader Shamil Basaev to the ground and sinks his 
teeth into Basaev’s throat. ‘“It seems I have the grip of a bulldog”, was the sick 
thought that came into [Putin’s] head, and he squeezed his teeth tighter. He savaged 
the vein until his tongue and palate could taste the salty blood, which was thick like 
oil”.’ In between killing Chechens the president reads the Roman poet Seneca, and 
eats the borshch that is brought to him by his wife.39 In a play called ‘Putin’s 
Holiday’, which opened in October 2007 on his 55th birthday, a helicopter with Putin 
and his biographer crashes in the remote forest of northern Siberia. Apparently 
uninjured, the president carries the unconscious writer to a woodcutter’s cottage 
where a discussion develops about Russia and its future destiny.40 Elsewhere, local 
people in Stavropol’ found they could protect a small wood where a building had been 
planned by calling it ‘Putin grove’ and attaching a portrait to every one of the 
threatened trees. ‘They only cut down trees without a picture of Putin’, Izvestiya was 
told; ‘if the tree has a portrait on it, they’re afraid’. In the event, a court decided that 
the construction had been illegal and the building was halted. ‘Truth and Putin’, 
declared the triumphant activists, ‘are on our side’.41 
Matters reached the point of a fully fledged cult in the village of Bol’shaya yel’nya 
in Nizhnii Novgorod, home to the ‘Rus’ Resurrecting’ sect, where a group of local 
residents had come to the conclusion that Putin had been the Apostle Paul in a 
previous life, not to mention Prince Vladimir (who had embraced Christianity in the 
tenth century and made it the official faith of Kievan Rus’) and the Biblical King 
Solomon. ‘We didn’t choose Putin’, Mother Fotiniya told Moskovskii komsomolets,
explaining how she had first set eyes on the ‘holy one’. ‘It was when Yeltsin was 
naming [Putin] as his successor. My soul exploded with joy! A Superman! God 
himself has chosen him’. Yeltsin, Fotinya went on, ‘was a destroyer, and God 
replaced him with a Creator’. The sect had a President Putin icon that Mother Fotinya 
claimed had mysteriously appeared one day; Fotinya herself claimed to be related to 
the Russian president, although ‘not in this century’. ‘He has given us everything’, she 
told reporters, pointing meaningfully at the sky (another paper unsportingly reported 
that Fotinya’s real name was Svetlana Frolova, and that she had been sentenced to a 
year and a half in prison in 1996 on fraud charges; there were more than five hundred 
sects of this kind in Russia, one of them celebrating a former provincial traffic 
policeman as the second coming of Christ).42 
Dimensions of a Leadership Cult 
 
By the end of Boris Yeltsin’s presidency his reputation was in terminal decline. The 
peak of his popularity, with an approval rating of 80 per cent, was in July 1990 after 
he had been elected chairman of the Russian parliament; his support rose again, to 74 
per cent, after the attempted coup in August 1991.43 Once in office, however, 
Yeltsin’s support declined rapidly. It had fallen to about 45 per cent at the time of the 
collapse of the USSR at the end of 1991, and fell still further after the spring of 1992 
as Prime Minister Yegor Gaidar’s economic policies began to bite. The president’s 
popularity recovered a little at the time of the April 1993 referendum, and again 
during the conflict with the Russian parliament in September and October 
1993, but then began to fall again, and by the end of 1994 his support was down to 34 
per cent. Just 3 per cent of Russians, by this time, were ready to say that they 
‘completely shared’ his views and policies; 10 per cent supported him ‘in the absence 
of other worthy political leaders’; but 25 per cent had become ‘disappointed’ in the 
Russian president, and 26 per cent were his declared opponents (another 5 per cent 
were prepared to support ‘anybody but Yeltsin’).44 
It was at this point, in December 1994, that Yeltsin sent Russian forces into 
Chechnya to restore federal authority and perhaps to recover his personal standing in 
what was expected to be a ‘small, victorious war’.45 If this was the intention, it came 
badly unstuck. Chechen resistance proved unexpectedly stubborn; the Russian 
campaign was incompetently conducted, particularly in its early stages; and losses 
were heavy, up to 30,000 within the first year. Yeltsin’s support, in the event, plunged 
still further, a majority holding him personally responsible for the war and just 6 per 
cent prepared to support him in the event of an early presidential election.46 In the 
end, with the help of a compliant media, Yeltsin recovered sufficiently to win the 
second round of the presidential election that took place in July 1996, but his 
reputation continued to decline and as his second term came to an end it was at a very 
low ebb indeed. By the end of 1999 just 1 per cent mentioned the president among the 
five or six politicians in whom they had confidence, and more than two-thirds were 
prepared to support demonstrations calling for his removal; if there had been elections 
‘next Sunday’, just 0.2 per cent would have voted for the incumbent.47 
Putin became acting president when Yeltsin stood down on New Year’s Eve, six 
months before the end of his second term. A second Chechen war was already in 
progress, prompted by a series of attacks on residential buildings in the late summer 
that had taken more than 300 lives. There were persistent rumours that the attacks had 
been encouraged, if not directly instigated, by the federal authorities themselves so 
that domestic opinion could quickly be mobilized behind Putin, who had already been 
identified as Yeltsin’s chosen successor as well as his prime minister.48 It was 
certainly clear that Putin’s vigorous prosecution of the war had been closely paralleled 
by a rise in his own popularity – just 2 per cent were prepared to back him for the 
presidency in August 1999, but by January 2000, as federal troops tightened their grip 
on Chechnya’s capital Grozny, he had the support of 62 per cent of those who were 
intending to vote in the election that was due to take place two months later.49 He won 
on the first round, and again in 2004 (see Tables 2 and 3);  
 
TABLE 2 
THE RUSSIAN PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION OF 26 MARCH 2000 
 
Name Nominated by Vote % 
Vladimir Putin Independent 39,740,467 52.94 
Gennadii Zyuganov Independent 21,928,468 29.21 
Grigorii Yavlinsky Independent 4,351,450 5.80 
Aman-Gel’dy Tuleev Independent 2,217,364 2.95 
Vladimir Zhirinovsky Liberal-Democratic Party of Russia 2,026,509 2.70 
Konstantin Titov Independent 1,107,269 1.47 
Ella Pamfilova Electoral association ‘For Civic Dignity’ 758,967 1.01 
Stanislav Govorukhin Independent 328,723 0.44 
Yuri Skuratov Independent 319,189 0.43 
Aleksei Podberezkin Independent 98,177 0.10 
Umar Dzhabrailov Independent 78,498 0.10 
Against all  1,414,673 1.88 
Invalid votes  701,016 0.93 
Source: Adapted from Vybory Prezidenta Rossiiskoi Federatsii. 2000. Elektoral’naya statistika 
(Moscow: Ves’ mir, 2000), pp.189–91, which incorporates the corrections made on 7 July 2000 
(Vestnik Tsentral’noi izbiratel’noi komissii Rossiiskoi Federatsii, No.19 (2000), pp.55–61). The 
registered electorate was 109,372,043, of whom 75,181,073 ‘took part in the elections’ by receiving a 
ballot paper (68.74 per cent), and 75,070,770 cast a valid or invalid ballot (68.64 per cent). 
‘Independents’ were nominated by ‘initiative groups’ of at least 100 electors that were themselves 
obliged to collect at least a million signatures in support of the nomination. 
 
throughout the two terms of his presidency his approval rating never fell below 60 per 
cent and it was sometimes well above 80 per cent, an exceptional level of support for 
the leader of a modern state and one that Russian commentators themselves described 
as ‘Turkmenian’.50 
There were certainly some fluctuations in Putin’s approval rating from month to 
month (see Figure 1). In August 2000, for instance, when his reaction to the sinking of 
the Kursk submarine was widely regarded as belated and callous (‘It sank’, he told the 
Larry King show on American television, without any obvious sign of remorse). But 
there was no loss of support in the spring of 2001 following the takeover of NTV 
television, an action in which ‘the majority of the population did not see Putin as 
being actively involved’.51 His apparently resolute action during the hostage-taking 
crisis of October 2002 won almost universal approval, and there was substantial if less 
universal support for his behaviour during the Beslan hostage-taking incident of 
September 2004.52 He lost ground in the early months of 2005 as protestors took the 
streets to denounce the conversion of social benefits into what they regarded as 
inadequate monetary equivalents, but recovered his position by the end of the year, 
and by March 2008, when he stood down at the end of his second presidential term, 
his rating stood at a spectacular 85 per cent.  
 
TABLE 3 
THE RUSSIAN PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION OF 14 MARCH 2004 
 
Name Nominated by Vote % 
Vladimir Putin Independent 49,558,328 71.31 
Nikolai Kharitonov Communist Party of the Russian Federation 9,514,554 13.69 
Sergei Glaz’ev Independent 2,850,610 4.10 
Irina Khakamada Independent 2,672,189 3.84 
Oleg Malyshkin LDPR 1,405,326 2.02 
Sergei Mironov Russian Party of Life 524,332 0.75 
Against all  2,397,140 3.45 
Invalid votes  578,847 0.83 
Source: Adapted from the corrected results as reported in Vestnik Tsentral’noi izbiratel’noi komissii 
Rossiiskoi Federatsii, 2006, No.5, pp.19–20. The registered electorate was 108,064,281 (Vybory 
Prezidenta Rossiiskoi Federatsii. 2004. Elektoral’naya statistika, Moscow: Ves’ mir, 2004, p.106), of 
whom 69,572,177 ‘took part in the elections’ by receiving a ballot paper (64.38 per cent) and 
69,501,326 cast a valid or invalid ballot (64.31 per cent). ‘Independents’ nominated themselves but 
were required to have the support of an electors’ group of at least 500, and were registered on the basis 
of the signatures of at least two million electors.  
 
Surveys had already found that he was placed ahead of all other Russian leaders in a 
list of those that were regarded with ‘admiration, respect or sympathy’: 78 per cent 
opted for Putin, ahead of Lenin and Andropov (both on 47 per cent), Nicholas II and 
Brezhnev (39 per cent), and Joseph Stalin (36 per cent);53 
FIGURE 1 
PUBLIC APPROVAL OF PUTIN, 2000 – 8 
 
The question was: ‘On the whole, do you approve or disapprove of the performance of Vladimir Putin 
as President?’ Figures are percentages. 
Source: Levada Centre. 
 
he came fifth, behind Pushkin, Peter the Great, Stalin and Lenin, in a list of the 
‘outstanding people of all times and peoples’.54 
Measures of ‘approval’ or ‘disapproval’ are not the only measure of a president’s 
standing. The national opinion research centre also asks respondents to rate the 
president on a scale of 1 (the worst mark) to 10 (the best). By the end of 1999, as 
Yeltsin concluded his second term, his rating was a miserable 1.9; Putin never fell 
below 5, and as his own second term concluded at the end of 2007 his score was an 
impressive 7.2.55 A massive 70 per cent at this time believed the Russian president 
could be ‘completely trusted’, and another 19 per cent thought he could be ‘partly 
trusted’; this was far in advance of the level of trust in any other civic institution, 
including the churches.56 As for their personal views, 9 per cent ‘admired’ the Russian 
president at the end of his second term, 41 per cent regarded him with ‘sympathy’, 
and another 34 per cent could simply ‘find nothing bad to say about him’.57 What was 
it about Putin that attracted ordinary Russians? More than anything else, according to 
the surveys, it was the perception that he was ‘energetic, decisive and strong-willed’; 
almost half of those who were asked found it hard to identify anything that 
dissatisfied them in the Russian president, and the single characteristic that attracted 
the most disapproval – that he was ‘connected with Yeltsin and his entourage’ – was 
of diminishing significance.58 
Putin, for his own part, deliberately appealed to the widest possible constituency. He 
was elected in 2000 and 2004 as an independent, nominated by citizens directly rather 
than a political party; and although he became the formal leader of United Russia in 
2008, he did not become a party member. Just as United Russia was nebulous, 
Russians also found it difficult to identify Putin with a political position. About half 
associated him with a ‘market economy’, for instance, but 30 per cent of those who 
were asked found it impossible to classify him in terms of any of the main political 
philosophies.59 As the pollster Yuri Levada put it, Putin was ‘a kind of mirror in 
which everyone, communist or democrat, sees what he wants to see and what he 
hopes for’.60 In the words of another commentator as Putin approached the end of his 
second term, the Russian president ‘consistently appeal[ed] to supporters of different 
values – conservative, social, liberal’; a ‘national leader can act in no other way’.61 
Putin, in a further view, had remained the ‘president of all Russians and national 
leader. He is president of the Zhirinovskyites, and of the Just Russianists, and 
unfortunately of the liberals and communists as well, because his policies combine 
liberal changes, great-power logic with its rhetoric, appeals for social justice, and the 
robust defence of national interests’.62 
Not only was he supported individually: an overwhelming majority, according to 
the Public Opinion Foundation, thought the Russian president had been much more 
successful (78 per cent) than unsuccessful (8 per cent) in what he had sought to 
achieve, and nearly as many (67 per cent) thought the president himself would be 
satisfied; on top of this, almost half (47 per cent) said their attitude towards the 
Russian president had improved over the course of the two terms (only 7 per cent took 
a less favourable view).63 Asked about his performance in various fields of policy, the 
picture was still a positive one although less uniformly so (see Figure 2, which is 
based on Levada Centre data and our own survey). At the end of his first year of 
office, only international affairs were seen on balance as a success; by the end of his 
second term ordinary Russians thought he had been more successful than 
unsuccessful in every field of policy, including the war in Chechnya, where the 
improvement was more striking than anywhere else. All the same, it was still his 
success in strengthening Russia’s position in international affairs that was seen as the 
most unqualified; there was a more equivocal verdict, over the years, on his 
contribution to the strengthening of democracy and political liberties, and still more 
serious doubts about his contribution to the improvement of living standards and the 
strengthening of public order, including a reduction in levels of corruption that were 
widely agreed to have worsened considerably over the same period. 
 
FIGURE 2 
SUPPORT FOR PUTIN’S POLICIES, 2001 – 8 
 
The question was: ‘How successfully in recent years has Vladimir Putin coped with the problems of: 
restoring public order; improving the economy and living standards; strengthening Russia’s 
international position; achieving a political settlement in Chechnya? Very successfully; fairly 
successfully; without much success; completely unsuccessfully; hard to say’. Figures show the 
percentage saying ‘very successfully’ or ‘fairly successfully’ minus the percentage saying ‘without 
much success’ or ‘completely unsuccessfully’. 
Source: Levada Centre and authors’ 2008 survey. 
 
The Public Opinion Foundation also asked whether the Putin presidency had been 
positive or negative, then in which respects particularly (these were open questions 
that respondents could answer in their own words). Once again, there were more 
positives than negatives (see Table 4), and overwhelmingly, both were related to the 
economy and living standards, although Russia’s more influential position in world 
affairs was also regarded favourably. ‘Before Putin we were poor’ was a typical 
response. The ‘standard of living’ had gone up; so had agriculture. Social issues had 
‘begun to receive more attention’; there had been more ‘support for small and 
medium business’; ‘the rouble had strengthened’; there was ‘more employment’; 
everywhere they were ‘building houses’; salaries had been increased, and were ‘being 
paid regularly’. For some, Russia had ‘renewed itself’ and ‘come out of its crisis’. 
Life at the same time had become more stable and predictable, in an almost Soviet 
sense: ‘certainty in the future’ had returned, and ‘things had become calmer’. And 
internationally, Russia was regarded with more respect. Among the negatives, prices 
had risen, but salaries (in the view of those who offered this opinion) had stayed 
where they were, so that ‘ordinary workers lived in poverty then, and still do’.64 
Overall, just a small plurality were likely to believe their living standards had 
improved, rather than declined; the evidence of official statistics, as Putin himself 
pointed out in his programmatic speech of February 2008, was in fact that real 
incomes had more than doubled over the two terms of his presidency.65 
TABLE 4 
POSITIVE AND NEGATIVE FEATURES OF THE PUTIN PRESIDENCY 
 
Positivea Negativeb
Increase in salaries, pensions, standard of living 19 Inflation and price rises 16 
Growth in Russia’s international authority 11 Poverty, low salaries and pensions 7 
Increase in stability and certainty in the future 9 Lack of attention to agriculture 4 
Timely payment of salaries and pensions 8 Increase in bribery and corruption 3 
Improvement in country’s economy 7 Economic regression 2 
Improvement in living conditions 7 Increase in crime 2 
Improvement in social policies 5 Poor social policy 2 
Notes: 
a Other positives (in percentages) were: end of crisis and strengthening of the state 3; increased 
employment 3; housing construction 3; more consumer goods 2; better defensive capacity 2; less 
corruption 2; stabilization of the situation in Chechnya 2; positive changes in public health and 
education 2; development of the national projects 2; demographic policy and the increase in the birth 
rate 2; others 1 or less. 
b Other negatives (in percentages) were: widening social inequalities 2; others 1 or less. 
Source: Adapted from ‘V. Putin: itogi prezidentstva’, 30 April 2008, at 
,http://bd.fom.ru./report/map/dominant/dom0817/d081721., accessed 5 May 2008; responses to open 
questions, in rounded percentages. 
 
Many of the same themes were reflected in the comments of the participants in a 
series of focus group discussions that took place at the beginning and just after the 
end of his two-term presidency.66 In the first instance, in the view of the Muscovites 
who were asked in December 2001, it was Putin’s appearance and manner that 
attracted approval, and the way in which they contrasted with those of his immediate 
predecessor. The new president, for a start, was ‘young and forward-looking’; all his 
predecessors had been elderly, and ‘now a person had been found who could lift up 
the country after its collapse’. Putin, other participants suggested, had ‘always 
conducted himself in a dignified way’ and was ‘always neatly dressed’. He was 
‘young, blond and energetic’, suggesting that he would lead the country along the 
‘right path’. He never interrupted, did not speak too much himself, and never shouted. 
Moreover, he was ‘a man of his word’ – even in the case of the Kursk, which had 
sunk in the summer of 2000, ‘he said he would raise the submarine and he did’. Some 
were impressed by his athletic background – especially in judo, which was ‘not a 
sport for the weak’; this, almost certainly, was one of the reasons for his ability to 
sustain a punishing work rate. And there was generally little concern that he had spent 
his earlier career in the security service. 
 But there had also been some early successes in the various fields of policy. For 
instance, he was apparently able to make up his mind quickly, and had been 
encouraging foreign investors to help the Russian economy to advance. New factories 
were being established, and new jobs created, so that Russia would no longer be 
obliged to import all its necessities as finished products. He was also having some 
success in the struggle against terrorism, and Russia had begun to act with more 
authority in world affairs. Nobody, at this early stage, had much idea what kind of 
programme Putin was putting forward, although it had ‘been published somewhere’. 
And perhaps in any case it was too soon to make a judgement; better to do so when he 
had reached the end of his period of office. But some were ready after just a couple of 
years to say that they had ‘not been disappointed’, in spite of the difficult situation the 
new president had inherited from his predecessor. There had indeed been ‘shock 
without therapy’. But even the elderly were still supportive, on this evidence, 
believing that any shortcomings could be attributed to Putin’s associates and that in 
any case it would take time for his various policies to show results. ‘What can a single 
person do?’, asked one elderly pensioner; ‘He inherited a state in total collapse. Local 
people everywhere just have to work’. 
 Many of the same themes were taken up by the participants in a separate series of 
discussions that took place in the summer of 2008 in a variety of urban locations67 
that focused more particularly on the outgoing president and his newly elected 
successor Dmitri Medvedev (the election result itself is shown in Table 5). What were 
the differences between them, as Medvedev took over the presidency and Putin 
moved back into the prime ministership? One obvious physical difference was that the 
new president had a full head of hair; another was his wife, a ‘real first lady’ who was 
‘much nicer and better dressed than Lyudmila Putina. But otherwise, Medvedev was 
seen as a ‘lapdog’ and a president who was likely to play a ‘secondary role’. Putin had 
at least ‘tried to do something’, but Medvedev had just ‘appeared on the screen’, like 
a ‘grey mouse’. Indeed it was sometimes hard to work out who was really the 
president; Putin, for instance, appeared more often on television and received more 
public attention. Medvedev, it seemed, ‘was needed to avoid having to change the 
Constitution for Putin’s benefit, and in this way to create the appearance of 
democracy, but at the same time to preserve Putin’s policies’; he was ‘too weak 
himself to begin to conduct some kind of policy of his own’. 
 The same views were echoed in other discussions. If Putin had a shortcoming, it 
was that he ‘looked like a KGB colonel’, whereas Medvedev reminded at least one of 
our participants of the last tsar, Nicholas II. But once again they were a ‘single team’, 
and ‘Putin [was] still in charge, just acting through Medvedev’; they were ‘two drops 
of water’; Medvedev ‘just repeat[ed]’ whatever Putin said; alternatively, he was just 
an ‘element of the “Putin” project’. Indeed for some Putin still was ‘the president’, 
and ‘still had that aura’; in another view, ‘everyone still mixe[d] them up’. Medvedev 
in any case was a ‘feeble successor . . . short and thin, with narrow shoulders’, not 
what a head of state should look like. Putin wasn’t particularly tall, admittedly, but he 
was handsome, and ‘what a body’! For those who were supportive of the Putin 
leadership, this identity was all to the good: Putin had been ‘leading them to stability’, 
and had pointed out the way forward to 2020 in his  
 
TABLE 5 
THE RUSSIAN PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION OF 2 MARCH 2008 
 
Name Nominated by Vote % 
Dmitri Medvedev United Russia 52,530,712 70.28 
Gennadii Zyuganov Communist Party of the Russian Federation 13,243,550 17.72 
Vladimir Zhirinovsky Liberal-Democratic Party of Russia 6,988,510 9.35 
Andrei Bogdanov Independent 968,344 1.30 
Invalid votes  1,105,533 1.36 
Source: Adapted from the Central Electoral Commission website www.vybory.izbirkom.ru, last 
accessed 15 Sept. 2008. The registered electorate was 107,222,016, of whom 74,746,649 (69.71 per 
cent) cast a valid or invalid ballot (it was no longer possible to vote ‘against all’ and with the abolition 
of minimum turnout requirements the number who ‘took part’ had no legal significance). Bogdanov 
was the leader of the Democratic Party of Russia but was nominated on the basis of the signatures of 
electors.  
 
programmatic speech of February 2008.68 But even those who were less supportive 
took much the same view. Putin and Medvedev, from this perspective, were ‘one big 
mafia’, who would ‘sooner or later all be presidents of one of the corporations, the oil 
and gas companies’; other leading figures, such as the nationalist Dmitri Rogozin or 
the left-wing economist Sergei Glaz’ev, would have made more effort to represent the 
interests of ordinary people. 
 
Explaining a Leadership Cult 
 
Our own conclusion, at the outset of his presidency, was that Putin drew ‘almost 
randomly’ for his support on all sections of the electorate. Those who declared a 
religious affiliation were slightly more likely than others to be Putin supporters, but 
there were no particular effects for church attendance itself, which is the more 
conventional measure of religiosity. There were slightly lower levels of support 
among those not in current employment, but taken as a whole the statistical evidence 
was ‘most remarkable for the lack of strong effects of this or any other kind’ – for 
instance, age, gender, education and income. There was an association between Putin 
support and economic reform, although for whatever reason, there was more support 
among those who opposed the stated policies of his administration than among those 
who supported them. But when everything else was equal, Putin supporters were no 
more likely than others to support the sale of land, or a move to insurance-based 
social policy; and they were no more likely than others to support the principle of 
strong leadership. Here as elsewhere they were ‘close to a cross-section of the entire 
society’.69 
How far had these patterns been maintained throughout the two terms of the 
presidency? We looked first at the various ways in which Putin’s support base was 
structured, and the extent to which his support was disproportionately concentrated in 
particular social groups. The survey included a single question that asked about 
approval or otherwise; a more reliable measure is to combine the five items used in 
Figure 2, which show how far respondents considered Putin had been successful or 
unsuccessful in the various policy areas. By combining these items into a single scale, 
scored from a low of zero to a high of 10, we derive an overall measure of how voters 
viewed Putin’s performance as president.70 Table 6 regresses a range of factors on this 
new variable; overall, they accounted for just 8 per cent of the variation in opinions 
about Putin’s policies, and just three of the nine factors were statistically significant. 
Most important by far were self-assessed living standards, with those who enjoyed 
higher standards of living much more likely to express support for his policies when 
other factors were constant.71 Next in importance was age, with those who were 
younger more likely to be supportive, following by being female. We can conclude 
from  
TABLE 6 
SOCIAL SUPPORT FOR PUTIN’S POLICIES 
 
Regression coefficients Means 
Partial Stand. 
Gender (male) .46 -.22* -.06* 
Age 44.36 -.01* --.07* 
Ethnic Russian .92 .36 .05 
Urban resident .75 .03 .01 
Religion  
Secular .14 -.20 -.04 
Regular church attendance 2.27 .08 .04 
Education (primary) 
Secondary .63 -.07 -.02 
Tertiary .19 -.20 -.04 
High living standards 2.89 .62* .26* 
Constant  4.24  
Adj R-squared  .08  
(N)  (2,000)  
* statistically significant at p<.0 
OLS regression estimates predicting support for Putin’s policies scored from zero to 10. All 
independent variables are scored zero or 1 except for age (years), church attendance (from 1, never 
attends, to 5, attends once a month or more), and high living standards (from 1, very poor, to 5, very 
high). 
Source: Authors’ 2008 survey. 
 
this analysis that support for Putin has relatively weak roots within the social 
structure, with the partial exception of those who are more affluent. 
 If social structure has relatively little impact on support for Putin, to what extent do 
attitudes matter? Putin had made it clear he wanted to enhance Russia’s economic 
performance, and his successes in this area were widely applauded. His attempts to 
move Russia towards more open and consultative forms of politics have been more 
ambiguous, so it is unclear to what extent his support is predicated on support for 
democratization itself. At the same time, the freedoms to take part in competitive 
elections and to express a variety of opinions were genuine reforms that Yeltsin 
supported during his period in office, and Putin has normally professed to favour 
them. Table 7 examines the extent to which opinions in these various areas – the 
economy, the political system, and public influence – served to predict support for 
Putin’s policies. The results show strong support for economic performance, and all 
three economic measures (especially the perception that the economy had performed 
well over the previous year) were statistically significant. Next in importance was the 
belief that there were opportunities to participate and influence events, and those who 
believed there had been major changes in 
 
TABLE 7 
ATTITUDINAL SUPPORT FOR PUTIN’S POLICIES 
 
Regression coefficients Means 
Partial Stand. 
Economic performance  
Economy doing well 3.03 .22* .10* 
Economy doing well in past year 3.30 .33* .17* 
Satisfied with things in country 2.96 .27* .15* 
Political system  
Country moving to democracy 2.22 .13* .06* 
Democracy better than alternatives 2.86 .11 .04 
More power to president 3.81 .22* .12* 
Changes in opportunities  
More opportunity to participate 7.68 .16* .15* 
More opportunity to influence events 5.08 .15* .17* 
Efficacy  
People can influence government 1.74 .09 .05 
Officials treat citizens more equally 1.60 .15* .06* 
Constant  -.34  
Adj R-squared  .38  
(N)  (2,000)  
* statistically significant at p<.01 
OLS regression estimates predicting support for Putin’s policies scored from zero to 10. All 
independent variables are scored as follows: economy doing well and economy past year (from 1, very 
bad, to 5, very good); satisfied with things (from 1, very unsatisfied, to 5, very satisfied); country 
moving to democracy (from 1, more democracy in Soviet times, to 5, proper democracy); democracy 
better than alternatives (from 1, strongly disagree, to 4, strongly agree); presidential power (from 1, 
parliament much more power, to 5, president much more power); influence government (from 1, no 
influence, to 4, significant influence); officials treat citizens equally (from 1, never, to 4, always). 
Changes in opportunity are both zero to 10 scales; see text for details. 
Source: As for Table 6.  
 
these respects were more likely to support Putin when other factors were held 
constant.72 Finally, those who felt the country was moving towards democracy were 
more likely to support Putin, as were those who wished to see power moved from 
parliament to the presidency. 
 These results suggest that Putin’s popularity has strong roots in how ordinary 
Russians view what he has achieved in Russia, and more especially in the country’s 
economic performance. The effect of perceptions of the economy is about twice as 
great as the effect of all the social structural variables we have considered taken 
together. In turn, perceptions of the economy account for almost half of the effect of 
political attitudes. Clearly, then, the performance of the economy and the material 
wealth that it has delivered to ordinary Russians must be a major part of any adequate 
explanation of the ‘Putin phenomenon’. And indeed, it was notable to what extent the 
president himself laid his emphasis on economic performance in considering the 
success of his various policies, for instance in his programmatic address to the State 
Council in February 2008. Public finances, he reminded the State Council members, 
had been in crisis at the time of his accession; inflation had been running at over 36 
per cent; and real incomes had fallen to as little as 40 per cent of their value at the end 
of the communist period. At the end of his second term, living standards were higher 
than ever before; economic growth was running at more than 8 per cent annually; real 
incomes and pensions had more than doubled, and unemployment had fallen by half.73 
The final stage in the analysis is to examine the extent to which it was attitudes 
towards Putin personally – rather than a broader range of political values – that 
accounted for United Russia’s overwhelming majority in the 2007 parliamentary 
elections (Putin had been the single candidate on the party’s federal list, and its 
election manifesto was entitled ‘Putin’s Plan: a worthy future for a great country’;74 
when the result was announced, newspapers declared that Putin had ‘won on the first 
round’75). Table 8 isolates these 
 
TABLE 8 
PUTIN’S POLICIES, ATTITUDES AND THE VOTE FOR UNITED RUSSIA 
 
Logistic regression coefficients 
Partial (SE) 
Support for Putin’s policies .27* (.06) 
Economic performance  
Economy doing well .11 (.13) 
Economy doing well in past year .20 (.11) 
Satisfied with things in country .31* (.09) 
Political system  
Country moving to democracy .21 (.11) 
Democracy better than alternatives -.09 (.12) 
More power to president .17 (.08) 
Changes in opportunities  
More opportunity to participate .15* (.05) 
More opportunity to influence events .03 (.05) 
Efficacy  
People can influence government .06 (.11) 
Officials treat citizens more equally .14 (.12) 
Constant -5.29  
Nagelkerke R-squared .28  
(N) (1,397)  
* statistically significant at p<.01 
Logistic regression estimates predicting vote for United Russia in the 2007 election. See Tables 6 and 7 
for scoring of variables. Estimates are for voters only. 
Source: As for Table 6. 
 
various effects by means of a logistic regression analysis, predicting the United 
Russia vote from support for Putin and the range of political attitudes included in 
Table 7.76 As the figures show, support for Putin is by far the most important single 
predictor of a vote for United Russia, and indeed it contributes almost half of the 
variance that is accounted for by the entire model. In contrast to the previous table, 
economic performance is unimportant, with the sole exception of general satisfaction 
with the state of affairs in the country as a whole: evidently, most of the effect of 
positive feelings about the economy on the vote is mediated through support for Putin 
as an individual.77 The only other factor of significance is the belief (whether valid or 
not) that opportunities to participate have been expanding, and this significantly   
increases the likelihood of voting for United Russia. 
 In general, our analysis suggests that there is indeed a ‘Putin phenomenon’, but that 
it is not for the most part associated with Putin as an individual. It is rather that a high 
value is placed on economic prosperity, which itself is associated with Putin’s 
leadership. On our evidence, the ‘Putin phenomenon’ has weak roots within the 
various groups of which Russian society is composed – or rather, continues to have, 
as we were able to draw the same conclusion from an examination of the survey 
evidence at the outset of the Putin presidency. As we expected, there were also some 
additional effects from political attitudes: whether or not it was thought that 
opportunities to participate had increased, and that individuals could exercise more 
influence on the political process. Economic judgements had much stronger effects: 
but they made relatively little difference to voting choices, once support for Putin 
individually had been included within the equation. This is rather different from a 
‘charismatic’ leadership, in which supporters are committed to the person of the 
leader without particular regard to policy outcomes; and rather different from a 
Western-style parliamentary system, in which support is a function of the procedures 
by which a leadership is selected and only secondarily of the policies that are pursued 
or the personal qualities of its individual members. 
 In turn, this suggests a Russian leadership with a basis of support that is ‘a mile 
wide but an inch deep’.78 Notwithstanding the Putin personality cult, which 
presumably owed something to orchestration from above, this was a leadership that 
owed more than anything else to its apparently successful stewardship of the national 
economy – a consequence, at least in part, of a rise in the world price of oil that had 
begun before Putin’s accession and already led to a resumption of economic growth.79 
But future prospects were less clear, as Putin’s second term came to an end: growth 
rates were slowing, inflation was increasing, and corruption was proving difficult to 
eliminate or even contain. For ordinary Russians, the Putin leadership had essentially 
continued after May 2008: only 9 per cent thought ‘real power’ was in the hands of 
Medvedev, compared with 36 per cent who thought it was still held by Putin; and 82 
per cent thought he would entirely or substantially continue Putin’s policies.80 It 
seemed unlikely that the relatively lightweight figure chosen as a means of continuing 
the Putin leadership by other means would generate any greater support – and rather 
more likely that the public standing of the Russian leadership would continue to be an 
artefact, sustained by policies that of themselves commanded support or (if these 
failed) by the use of force but not on the basis of the personal qualities of the 
individuals that held the presidency itself.  
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